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Congress, Public Values,
and the Taxing Power
By Mary L. Heen*

I

n an article published several years
ago, I examined the financing
dimension of private choice and
proposed a framework for analyzing Congress’s taxing and spending
decision-making processes. Although
issues other than health care reform
provided the impetus for the article, the
framework developed there provides
a broader perspective from which to
consider the taxing power portion
of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. — (2012).
The article’s abstract stated in part as
follows:
Congress coordinates its taxing
and spending decisions through
the budget process, collectively
determining what will be financed
and performed through government and what will be left to
private choice.The courts generally
defer to the taxing and spending decisions made by Congress.
Nevertheless, in the process of
developing this highly deferential
approach, the U.S. Supreme Court
historically has drawn distinctions
between taxes and other means
of paying for or regulating the
production of goods and services.
Although it can be quite difficult
to distinguish “taxes” or “revenue
raising” from “user fees,”“prices,” or
“penalties,” they are not constitutionally interchangeable.When the
Court has interpreted express limitations on Congress’s taxing power,
it has drawn distinctions similar to
those drawn in the privatization
literature between “individual”
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond
School of Law. The full article, Congress, Public
Values, and the Financing of Private Choice, from
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and “collective” financing.These
doctrinal distinctions reflect the
democratic values inherent in
Congress’s taxing and spending
powers.
As explained in greater detail in the
article, private choice can be financed
individually, that is, paid for by an
individual’s own resources, facilitated by
general tax reduction and by deregulation. Alternatively, private choice can
be financed collectively by using tax
revenues (or government-borrowed
funds) to pay for privately provided
goods and services.The tendency in
political debate to conflate those two
forms of financing, as well as the failure
to distinguish between financing and
performance, obscures important
decisions about private choice and
the government’s role in managing
or monitoring collectively financed
activities.

Defining Public Values:
Congress’s Taxing and Spending
Powers

In interpreting express constitutional
limits on the taxing power, the Supreme
Court historically has analyzed the
government’s taxing power in relation
to its financing function. Differences
between collective and individual
financing thus underlie certain distinctions important in constitutional
analysis.The cases suggest, for example,
that express constitutional limitations
on the taxing power are enforced when
Congress is engaged in general “revenue
raising” as opposed to collecting fees
in exchange for goods or services.That
is, an imposition may be a “tax” when
funds are collected from private parties
for a “public” purpose.
In addition, the Court has drawn
historically significant distinctions
between “taxes” and “penalties” for
regulatory violations. In the early part
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of the last century, taxes were upheld
as valid revenue measures rather than
prohibited regulatory “penalties” if they
were unconditional taxes, achieving
their regulatory effects through their
rate structure; or if their regulatory
provisions bore a “reasonable relation”
to their enforcement as a revenue
measure.
When this doctrinal distinction
became less salient after the Court’s
view of the commerce power expanded
during the New Deal period, the
Court generally tended to treat tax
provisions producing revenue as
constituting valid “revenue” measures.
After adopting a more expansive view
of national legislative powers, the Court
never again held a federal tax to be an
impermissible effort by Congress to
impose regulatory standards outside the
scope of its other enumerated powers.
Because taxes imposed as regulatory
penalties in the past had been upheld as
sufficiently necessary and proper under
the Commerce Clause, the relationship
between the taxing power and other
legislative powers received no serious
discussion or reconsideration until the
Court’s decision last June in Sebelius.

A Functional Approach to the
Taxing Power

The portion of Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion applying a “functional”
approach to the taxing power is fully
consistent with those earlier cases.
The Chief Justice wrote for the Court
that regardless of the label applied by
Congress, the “shared responsibility”
exaction imposed on the uninsured is a
valid “tax” for constitutional purposes as
opposed to an impermissible regulatory
“penalty.” In reaching that conclusion,
Chief Justice Roberts applied three
“practical” factors considered by the
Court in 1922 when it invalidated the
“Child Labor Tax” in Drexel Furniture.
Decided when the Commerce Clause
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was thought not to permit federal
regulation of child labor, Drexel Furniture held that an excise tax imposed
on employers for noncompliance with
child labor restrictions was an improper
regulatory device rather than a valid
revenue measure.
In distinguishing the statute at issue
in Drexel Furniture from the individual
mandate, Chief Justice Roberts pointed
out that unlike the “penalty” of ten
percent of the company’s net income
for employing children, the shared
responsibility exaction imposes a
relatively low level of burden on those
without insurance (usually less than the
cost of insurance and, by statute, never
more than that cost). Sebelius, slip op.
at 35. In addition, although the Child
Labor Tax was imposed on only those
who knowingly broke the law, the
individual mandate of the health care
legislation contains no scienter or mens
rea requirement, a feature typical of
punitive statutes. Id. Finally, he observed
that although the Child Labor Tax was
enforced in part by the Department
of Labor, the shared responsibility
“payment is collected solely by the
IRS through the normal means of
taxation—except that the Service is
not allowed to use those means most
suggestive of a punitive sanction, such as
criminal prosecution.” Id. at 36 (emphasis in original).
After concluding that the shared
responsibility exaction is a “tax,” Chief
Justice Roberts then went on to analyze
whether the “tax” complied with other
express constitutional limitations on the
taxing power. Although the Supreme
Court has generally accorded Congress
a presumption of validity in the exercise
of its taxing power, express constitutional limitations on the taxing power
include the uniformity requirement
imposed on indirect taxes, the prohibition against the taxation of exports,
and the apportionment requirement
imposed on direct taxes. In addition,
under the Origination Clause, all bills
for “raising revenue” must originate
in the House of Representatives.The
taxing power is also limited by the
crosscutting limitations of the Bill of
Rights, which can apply to any exercise
of congressional power.
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Chief Justice Roberts rejected the
argument asserted by the plaintiffs that
the shared responsibility payment was
a “direct” tax subject to the apportionment requirement. He first observed
that a tax on going without health
insurance was not within any recognized category of “direct” tax. It is not a
“capitation” and “also plainly not a tax
on the ownership of land or personal
property.” Id. at 41.
He then went on to explain why it
was not troubling to permit Congress to
impose a tax for not doing something
when it had held that the Commerce
Clause “did not permit Congress
to regulate those who abstain from
commerce.” Id. at 41. According to
the Chief Justice, three considerations
allayed any potential concern. First,“and
most importantly, it is abundantly clear
the Constitution does not guarantee
that individuals may avoid taxation
through inactivity,” with the express
contemplation of a capitation tax by
the Constitution. He then pointed out
that Congress’s use of the Taxing Clause
“to encourage buying something is,
by contrast, not new,” citing provisions
related to the home mortgage interest
deduction and certain higher education tax incentives. Id. at 42. Second,
although Congress’s ability to use its
taxing power to influence conduct is
not without its limits, the shared responsibility payment “passed muster” within
the “strictest limits” applied by the
Court.“More often, and more recently,”
he observed, the Court had “declined to
closely examine the regulatory motive
or effect of revenue raising measures.”
Id. He noted,“we need not here decide
the precise point at which an exaction
becomes so punitive that the taxing
power does not authorize it.” Id. at 43.
Third, imposition of a tax “nonetheless
leaves an individual with a lawful choice
to do or not to do a certain act, so long
as he is willing to pay a tax levied on
that choice.”The only thing they may
not lawfully do “is not buy health insurance and not pay the resulting tax.” Id. at
44 & n.11.
In the past, courts have offered limited
additional guidance with regard to the
meaning of the term “revenue” in other
constitutional contexts, distinguishing
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between revenue measures and special
assessments or user fees. In interpreting
the Origination Clause, for example, the
Supreme Court has included revenues
intended for the general support of
government but not special assessments
designed to fund specific programs
through fines or fees. For purposes of
interpreting the Export Clause, which
prohibits the taxation of exports from
the states, the Supreme Court has similarly distinguished between prohibited
taxes on exports and permissible user
fees tied to specific benefits, services,
or facilities.Thus, in defining revenue
provisions, both Origination Clause and
Export Clause cases draw distinctions
between individually financed “user
fees” and collectively financed “general
revenues.”

Federalism and the Spending
Power

On the spending side, Congress
also has had a great deal of latitude
historically in determining whether a
particular expenditure serves “public”
purposes, that is, whether the spending
is in pursuit of the “general welfare.”
Under the spending power cases such
as South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1987), objectives not thought to be
within the enumerated legislative
powers “may nevertheless be attained
through the use of the spending power
and the conditional grant of federal
funds.” Id. at 207. In Dole the Court
adopted a multi-part test to determine
whether federal spending conditions
are constitutional. Although the Court
also noted that Congress cannot enact
spending conditions to induce the
states to engage in unconstitutional
acts or to coerce states into actions rather
than offering them a choice, no clear
limiting principle on the spending
power had emerged under the Court’s
subsequent federalism decisions until
its decision on the Medicaid portions
of the health care reform legislation.
In Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts
observed that the threatened loss of all
of the state’s existing federal Medicaid
funding if a state declined to comply
with the legislation’s expanded Medicaid coverage provisions was coercive,
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contrary to federalism, and thus, an
impermissible spending condition. Slip
op. at 45-58. Finding the Medicaid
provision to be severable from the rest
of the legislation, the Court remedied
the constitutional violation by precluding the Secretary from withdrawing
existing Medicaid funds for failure to
comply with the requirements set out
in the expansion. Id. at 55-58.

Taxing and Spending: The
Financing and Performance of
Private Choice

The combined impact of the Chief
Justice Roberts’ analysis in Sebelius of
the taxing and spending powers suggest
that the Court will continue to defer to
Congress’s broad authority to enact tax
provisions with either revenue-raising
or revenue-losing effects. Constitutionally required enactment procedures,
including bicameralism and presentment, provide democratic legitimacy for
Congress’s taxing and spending decisions. Of course, such decision making
procedures apply to all legislation,
whether Congress is raising or lowering
taxes, enacting targeted tax incentives,
or appropriating funds.The fostering
of other democratic values, including
transparency and accountability, depends
upon the availability of information
about and public understanding of those
decisions.
As I argued in my earlier article,
general tax reduction and targeted tax
incentives, both ways of advancing
privatization goals, differ in approaches
to financing. General tax reduction
results in more individual financing
of goods and services.Targeted tax
incentives, on the other hand, like the
home mortgage interest deduction and
higher education tax credits, subsidize
certain legislatively favored activities,
and therefore comport with the pattern
of privatization typically followed in
the United States of retaining collective
financing but delegating performance
to the private sector. Across-the-board
tax reduction and targeted tax incentives advance different privatization
goals, with very different political
consequences.
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The argument that targeted tax
incentives are more like spending
programs than across-the-board tax
cuts is somewhat counterintuitive
and has been controversial in both
academic and political quarters.
Regardless of whether that argument
is accepted as a matter of theory,
however, the characterization of tax
provisions as revenue raisers or revenue
losers provides useful information
to legislators because taxing and
spending decisions tend to be made
incrementally, and by reference to a
current budgetary or revenue baseline.
Since enactment of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, for example,
Congress has required that a list of
“tax expenditures” be included in the
budget showing revenue losses from
certain existing federal income tax
incentives.
Tax incentives generally do not
involve negotiated relationships
between government and private
contractors, but typically involve tax
reporting to the Internal Revenue
Service and oversight jurisdiction by the
tax-writing committees.The delivery
of subsidies through the tax system can
mask governmental funding levels and
allocations and obscure accountability
for outcomes being funded.The use of
tax incentives as an alternative to discretionary spending by government serves
privatization goals through their use of
market incentives and private choice.
Targeted tax incentives encourage
private businesses or individuals to
engage in certain socially or economically favored activities.This type of
“privatization” also involves a redrawing
of lines between the public and private
sectors, however, making public goals
private interests by modifying market
incentives. Privatization proponents
tend to favor tax incentives as an
alternative to government performance.
Incentives use the tax system to
stimulate private activity, a mechanism
that permits the market to respond to
individual preferences. Proponents tend
to view the market as representing an
aggregation of individual preferences
and thus an effective and cost-efficient
way of achieving goals. Under this view,

10

public purposes would be well served
by programs that permit the market
to operate with as little government
control as possible.
Critics of privatization tend to view
public values as representing something
other than the aggregation of individual
preferences.They point out that the
exercise of individual choice in the
marketplace is quite different from
collective choice exercised through
political participation in the democratic
process.The marketplace records individual preferences through purchasing
power. Its increased use for performance
of collectively financed activities, critics
argue, may result in a loss of political
participation and deliberation as well as
the loss of those choices made possible
through government action.

Conclusion

In sum, although the Constitution
links the taxing power with the power
to spend for the “general welfare,” the
courts have largely deferred to the
political process for determination of
the public purposes appropriate for
congressional action.The political
dynamics involve raw budgetary
conflicts, contested ideas about the
value of collective versus private choice,
and deep differences in views about
governmental competencies and functions. Although the Court in the future
may opt to enforce limits on Congress’s
use of tax penalties or tax incentives
for regulatory purposes, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sebelius demonstrates its current willingness to accord
Congress a presumption of validity in
the exercise of its taxing power.
Achieving greater political accountability for both the financing and
performance of tax incentives remains
a central challenge. Administrative
lawyers and scholars are engaged in
studying new ways in which regulation,
contracts, and contract monitoring may
respond to the accountability problems
created by increased “contracting out”
or privatization of government services.
A parallel effort to study ways in which
effective monitoring of tax incentives
can be accomplished needs to be
undertaken.
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